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This thesis examines the interactions among education, economic growth and income
inequality in an endogenous growth model with improvements in the quality of prod-
ucts. We extend the framework of Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2004) to allow
for endogenous formation of human capital.
In our model, human capital, economic growth and income inequality are all endoge-
nously determined. Workers choose between being unskilled or obtaining an education
and earning a higher wage, and human capital accumulation is determined by their con-
sumption optimization.
We find the following interesting results under the reasonable assumption that innova-
tion is a relatively more skill intensive activity than imitation. First, under certain con-
ditions, economic growth exhibits cross-country convergence. Second, the relationship
between income inequality and economic growth shows an inverted-U pattern. Third,
an increase in the productivity of workers (both skilled and unskilled), a rise in edu-
cation subsidy or an income tax cut promotes growth and reduces inequality. Finally,
education subsidies and income taxes have stronger growth effects for countries farther
from the technological frontier.
We believe that our findings can help us understand many issues related to education,
v
growth and inequality. In particular, our findings shed light on the relationship between
technological progress and wage inequality. Many economists believe that wage in-
equality rises because skill-biased technological progress raises the demand for skilled
workers and reduces the demand for unskilled workers. Our results show that respond-
ing to a higher wage rate for skilled workers, the supply of skilled workers increases
and hence lowers wage inequality in the model.
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Technological progress, the main engine of economic growth, comes from deliberate
research and development activities in the course of market competition. The incorpo-
ration of R&D and imperfect competition into the growth framework starts from Romer
(1987,1990), and significant contributions are made by Aghion and Howitt (1992) and
Grossman and Helpman (1991, chapter 3&4). In these models, technological advance
results from purposive R&D activity, and this activity is rewarded by some form of ex
post monopoly power. The growth rate can remain positive in the long run, if there is
no tendency for the economy to run out of ideas.
The recent contribution to endogenous growth theory includes Aghion and Howitt (2004)
and Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2004). They build up a quality-improving
growth model, and show that skilled labor has a higher growth-enhancing effect closer
to the technological frontier by assuming that innovation is relatively more skill inten-
sive than imitation. In their model, the two channels for technological progress, inno-
vation and imitation could occur in the same sector at the same time, and each of these
activities is a combination of skilled and unskilled labor. Their model is versatile in
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examining various issues such as cross-country convergence, and the interplay between
growth and institutional change. However, they did not discuss much on income in-
equality in the course of economic growth, or endogenize human capital accumulation,
which are issues of our interest and will be discussed in this thesis.
Human capital accumulates mainly through education and learning by doing, as dis-
cussed in Lucas (1988) and Arrow (1962). Finadlay and Kierzkowski (1983) construct
a model of human capital accumulation through education. In their model, the wages
of skilled and unskilled labor and the direct and indirect costs of education are all de-
termined endogenously, since workers can choose between being unskilled and earning
a lower wage or obtaining an education and earning a higher wage. This basic model
will be extended to human capital accumulation with both education and “learning by
doing” in this thesis.
As to whether the rate of human capital accumulation or stock of human capital is
more critical to economic growth, there are diverse opinions among economists. Lucas
(1988) emphasizes the rates of accumulation of human capital, while other economists
such as Nelson and Phelps (1966) emphasize the stock of human capital. There are
many empirical results regarding the growth effect of stock of human capital. Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (2004, chapter 12) find that the growth rate has significantly positive rela-
tion with the quantity measure of education such as the average years of secondary and
higher schooling for male, and the qualitative measure of education, such as outcome on
internationally comparable examinations. In Hanushek and Kimko (2000), labor force
quality has a consistent, stable, and strong relationship with economic growth based on
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various empirical analysis. In this thesis, we adopt the Nelson-Phelps approach.
The growth effect of education is considered to be heterogeneous across countries by
economists. Krueger and Lindahl (2001) find that the effect of the initial level of edu-
cation is highly heterogeneous between rich countries, low-income and middle-income
countries, and “education [is] statistically significantly and positively associated with
subsequent growth only for the countries with the lowest level of education”. Evidence
of heterogeneous effects has also been provided by Durlauf and Johnson (1995), and
evidence of non-linearities by Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas, Savvides and Stengos (2001)
but was informed little by theoretical analysis.
The history of cross-country income differences exhibits mixed pattern of convergence
and divergence. Many studies in the literature 1 predict that a poor country grows faster
than a rich one, so that the poor country tends to catch up to the rich one in terms of
levels of per capita income, which is often referred to as “β convergence”. Baumol
(1986), Durlauf and Johnson (1995), Quah (1993, 1997), and Mayer-Foulkes (2002,
2003) have also observed that the history of income differences since the mid 20th
century is “club-convergence”, that is, all rich and most middle-income countries seem
to belong to one group, or “convergence club”, with the same long-run growth rate,
whereas all other countries seem to have diverse long-run growth rates, all strictly less
than that of the convergence club.
Aside from convergence, income inequality is another critical issue in growth and devel-
1Barro (1984, chapter 12), Baumol (1986), DeLong (1988), Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1992)
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opment theory. In his seminal paper on income inequality, Kuznets (1955) introduced
the hypothesis of inverted-U pattern relationship of income inequality and economic
development. Numerous studies, including Randolph and Lott (1993), Ram (1995),
and Jha (1996), have tried to assess if the Kuznets-U pattern of evolution of income in-
equality exists during the course of modern economic growth. Robinson (1976) proved
the inverted-U shape to be a general phenomenon if the variance serves as the measure
of inequality; and Knight (1976) showed the same to hold true for the Gini coefficient,
however, using the extreme assumption of perfect equality within sectors.
One implication we can draw from Kuznets’ U hypothesis is the reinforcing relation
between equality and growth for the high-growth countries. Chang and Ram (2000)
find significant structural difference between high-growth and low-growth economies
in income inequality. They also argue that the high-growth scenario is characterized
by lower inequality at all income levels, and this high-growth advantage is particularly
large at low income levels, thus growth and equality could be mutually reinforcing.
Because many families have little income other than wages, we can use the real wage
ratio as a measure for income inequality of a large segment of the society.2 The data for
most industrialized countries show increasing real wage inequality.3 Some economists,
including Bound and Johnson (1992) and Krueger (1993), link the rising inequality in
real wages to the skill-biased technical change, which increases the marginal product
of skilled labor and reduces the marginal product of unskilled labor. Therefore, such a
skill-biased change increases the demand for skilled labor and reduces the demand of
2This conclusion is drawn by, among others, Abel and Bernanke 1998.
3See Davis (1992).
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unskilled labor, resulting in the increasing gap between the real wages of skilled labor
and unskilled labor. However, these analysis are mainly from the demand side of the
market. Considering the effect of wage change on human capital accumulation, we
may expect the reinforcing relation between inequality reduction and development for
the countries close to the frontier, as will be discussed in this thesis.
1.2 Objective and Organization
The objective of this thesis is to build a general equilibrium model by incorporating
the formation of human capital through education into the quality-improving growth
model. We also make an attempt to examine the growth and income distribution ef-
fects of educational policy, income tax, interest rate, and other factors characterizing
technological progress.
The general equilibrium model of the product market and labor market is constructed
by combining a growth model with an education model. For the growth model, we
mainly follow the quality-improving growth model in Aghion and Howitt (2004) and
Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2004), where human capital accumulation, i.e. the
supply of skilled labor and unskilled labor is exogenous. In this thesis, we endogenize
the supply of skilled labor through a model of education. We simplify the human capi-
tal accumulation model in Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983) into a two-period model of
consumption optimization, and incorporate “learning by doing” and government poli-
cies such as education subsidy and income tax into it. Workers choose between being
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unskilled or obtaining an education to maximize their lifelong income, and their con-
sumption optimization generates the condition for optimal supply of skilled labor.
Using the distance to the technological frontier as an inverse measure of economic de-
velopment, and the wage ratio of skilled and unskilled labor as a measure of income
inequality, we can examine the characteristics of growth convergence and income in-
equality through comparative statics of the general equilibrium. Besides, the interrela-
tion between growth and inequality is also of our interest, and we show that the Kuznets’
inverted-U relation exists for income inequality and economic development.
This general equilibrium model of product market and labor market is also versatile in
diverse cases. We want to see the effects of the government policies such as education
subsidy and income tax on growth and income inequality, and see if the growth effects
of these policies are heterogeneous across countries. We will also examine the growth
effects of product market competition, interest rate and various efficiency parameters.
As will be shown in later parts, a medium level of monopoly power helps both growth
and inequality reduction. It is also growth enhancing and inequality reducing to de-
crease interest rate or increase the values of some efficiency parameters, including the
elasticities of unskilled labor in innovation or imitation, the overall efficiency of tech-
nological improvement, and the relative efficiency of innovation. We also show that an
increase in education subsidy and a reduction in income tax are growth enhancing for
only poor countries, if there is perfect substitution between imitation and innovation.
This thesis is organized as follows. In the next chapter, we develop a general equilib-
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rium model where innovation and imitation may not be perfect substitutes. It includes
a model of productivity improvement with an endogenous distance to the technological
frontier, and a consumption model of education where an individual’s lifetime income
is affected by his/her education decision. The equilibrium can not be solved analytically
in this general model. To find analytical results, we examine a simplified version of the
general model where the two activities are perfect substitutes in chapter 3. We also
conduct numerical analysis of the general model in chapter 4. We analyze the compar-
ative statics of the distance to the technological frontier, educational policy and other
factors characterizing technological progress, and examine their effects on economic
growth and income inequality. The final part provides some concluding remarks and





In this section, we follow the production model in Aghion and Howitt (2004) and Van-
denbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2004).
In every period and in any particular country, final output y is produced competitively








where yt is the final output at time t, Ai,t is the productivity in sector i, xi,t is the flow
of intermediate good i used in final production at time t and α ∈ (0, 1). Given that
the final good sector is competitive, the price of each intermediate input is equal to its








where pi,t is the price of intermediate good i at time t.
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In each intermediate sector i, one intermediate producer can produce good i with pro-
ductivity Ai,t using final good as capital according to a one-for-one technology. The
equation of motion of productivity level Ai,t will be discussed in later parts. For sim-
plicity, we assume the cost of producing one unit of xi,t is one. The local monopolist








Substituting this into (2.2), we have pit = 1/α. Thus, α can be viewed as an inverse
measure of monopoly power, since it is negatively related with the monopoly price.
The corresponding monopoly profit in intermediate sector is then simply equal to:
pii,t = (pi,t − 1)xi,t = δAi,t (2.3)
where δ ≡ (1/α− 1)α 21−α .
In line with the recent literature on endogenous growth1, and in particular following the
extension part in Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2004), we characterize techno-
logical progress as a non-linear function of imitation and innovation, i.e. these activi-
ties are not perfect substitutes. Define A¯t−1 and At−1 as the productivity of the global
technological frontier and the productivity of the country at the end of period t − 1
1In literatures such as Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2002),
technological progress is characterized as a linear function of imitation and innovation
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respectively. We contemplate a general productivity growth function:
Ai,t = Ai,t−1 + λ[(uσm,i,ts
1−σ
m,i,t)
ρ(A¯t−1 − At−1)ρ + γ(uφn,i,ts1−φn,i,t)ρAρt−1]1/ρ (2.4)
where um,i,t (resp. sm,i,t) is the amount of unskilled (resp. skilled) labor input used
in imitation in sector i at time t, un,i,t (resp. sn,i,t) is the amount of unskilled (resp.
skilled) units of labor used by sector i in innovation at time t, σ (resp. φ) is a mea-
sure of unskilled-labor elasticity of productivity growth in imitation (resp. innovation),
γ > 0measures the relative efficiency of innovation compared to imitation in generating
productivity growth, λ > 0 measures the efficiency of the overall process of technolog-
ical improvement, and ρ ∈ [0, 1] measures the substitutability between imitation and
innovation activities in generating productivity growth. From (2.4), we can see that
the “backward advantage” in imitation, i.e. the greater the difference of the country’s
productivity from that of the technological frontier, the more productivity improvement
can be made through imitation.
We assume that skilled labor has a higher elasticity of productivity growth in innovation
activities than in imitation activities, i.e. φ < σ.



























where a ≡ At−1
A¯t−1 is an inverse measure of the country’s distance to the technological
frontier. Note that the “backward advantage” of productivity improvement in imitation
is also reflected in the above equation. We can also see from the above equation that the
activities of innovation and imitation are not perfect substitutes for economic growth.
Let wuA¯t−1 (resp. wsA¯t−1) denote the wage of unskilled (resp. skilled) labor. The total
labor cost of productivity improvement by the intermediate firm i at time t, denoted as
Wi,t, is
Wi,t = [wu(um,i,t + un,i,t) + ws(sm,i,t + sn,i,t)] A¯t−1 (2.7)
Using (2.3) and the fact that the entrepreneurs live for one period only and thus maxi-
mize current profit net of labor costs, each intermediate good producer i at date t will
choose (um,i,t, un,i,t, sm,i,t, sn,i,t) to solve the following program:
max
um,i,t, un,i,t, sm,i,t, sn,i,t
λδ[uσm,i,ts
1−σ
m,i,t(1− a) + γuφn,i,ts1−φn,i,ta]A¯t−1 −Wi,t (2.8)






Given there is a mass 1 of intermediate firms, the labor market equilibrium writes:
S = sm,t + sn,t (2.9)
U = um,t + un,t (2.10)
11
where S and U are the total supply of skilled and unskilled labor respectively.
Substituting the above equations, we get the optimization problem as
max





m (1− a) + γuφns1−φn a
]− [wu(um + un) + ws(sm + sn)]













































Equating the wage rates across equations, we have
σ(1− a)ρuσρ−1m sρ(1−σ)m = γφaρuφρ−1n sρ(1−φ)n (2.14)
(1− σ)(1− a)ρuσρm sρ(1−σ)−1m = γ(1− φ)aρuρφn s(1−φ)ρ−1n (2.15)














The above equation shows that the ratio of unskilled to skilled employment in imitation
is proportional to that in innovation, and also proportional to the wage ratio.
Defining ψ ≡ σ(1−φ)
(1−σ)φ , and substituting in (2.9) and (2.10), we can rewrite (2.16) as
um =
ψUsm
S + (ψ − 1)sm (2.17)
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2.2 Consumption
In this section, we simplify the consumption model in Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983)
into a two-period model of consumption optimization, and solve for the supply of
skilled labor.
There are N individuals born at the beginning of each time period, each of them having
a lifetime of two periods. The population is therefore stationary, with the entry ofN new
individuals exactly offset by the death of individuals who have lived for two periods.
Individuals can be “unskilled worker” or “skilled worker”. The difference between
them is that unskilled worker earns the wage of respective level immediately from the
beginning of lifetime, however, the skilled worker needs to acquire an education in the
first period, and become skilled to earn a higher wage than unskilled worker in the next
period. Suppose s individuals choose to become educated in each period, the remaining,
equal to u, becoming unskilled workers. The total population though the two periods is
s+ u = N .
Assume that the human capital skilled labor accumulates through education is related
with the country’s distance to the technological frontier. The closer the country is to
the frontier, the more skill an individual can acquire in education, and this effect has
diminishing returns. Denote the human capital of a skilled labor as H(a) ≥ 1, we thus
have ∂H(a)
∂a
> 0, and ∂
2H(a)
∂a2
< 0. The present value of the lifetime income of a skilled
worker is
−(1− θ)Ft + (1− τ)H(a)Ws,t+1
1 + r
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where Ft = A¯t−1f is the tuition fee for the education of one period, r is the interest
rate, θ is the rate of subsidy on education cost by the government, Ws,t+1 = wsA¯t is the
wage rate for skilled labor at time t + 1, and τ is the income tax rate. The total supply
of skilled labor (measured in effective labor) is
S = sH(a) (2.18)
Following Arrow (1962), we assume that the acquisition of human capital is related to
experience. Suppose the unskilled worker can acquire a skill level of L(a) ≥ 1 through
“learning by doing” after the first period of working. The present value of an unskilled







where Wu,t = wuA¯t−1 is the wage rate of unskilled worker at time t. The total supply
of unskilled labor (measured in effective labor) is
U = u[1 + L(a)] (2.19)
In equilibrium, since skilled and unskilled worker have the same lifetime income, indi-
viduals are indifferent between investment in education and work. Thus, we have








Divide both sides of the above equation by A¯t−1, and denote g¯ ≡ A¯tA¯t−1 −1 as the growth





(H(a)ws − L(a)wu)− wu
]
= (1− θ)f (2.20)
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2.3 Equilibrium
Now let H(a) = L(a) = 1 for simplicity, then the supply of skilled labor and unskilled
labor are S = s and U = 2(N − s). We can rewrite (2.17) as
um =
2ψ(N − s)sm
s+ (ψ − 1)sm (2.21)
In equilibrium, the labor supply equals labor demand, as in equation (2.9) and (2.10).
We can find expressions of un and sn in terms of s and sm by substituting (2.21) into
(2.10) and rearranging (2.9).
un =
2(N − s)(s− sm)
s+ (ψ − 1)sm (2.22)
sn = s− sm (2.23)







sm[s+ (ψ − 1)sm]
ρ(σ−φ)
1−ρ = s− sm (2.24)
which is the relation between demand of skilled labor and that of skilled labor used in
imitation, from the production model.
From the equal income equation (2.20) in consumption part, we can get the following
equation by substituting in (2.16) and (2.21-2.23).
15













s+ (ψ − 1)sm
]σρ
sρm(1− a)ρ + γ
[
2(N − s)









s+ (ψ − 1)sm
]σρ−1
sρ−1m (2.25)
which is the relation between the supply of skilled labor and that of skilled labor used
in imitation, from the consumption model.
The equilibrium quantity of skilled labor (s) and skilled labor used in imitation (sm)
can be solved from equation (2.24) and (2.25). Equilibrium labor supplies, growth rate,
and wage ratio can be obtained by substituting the equilibrium s and sm into equation
(2.21-2.23), (2.6) and (2.16) .
However, there is no analytical solution for the model due to non-linearity in the above
equations. We will solve the equilibrium through simulation and discuss on related
competitive statics in chapter 4.
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Chapter 3
A Simplified Model with Perfect Substitution
between Imitation and Innovation
3.1 Production
In this section, we follow the general model in chapter 2, and let ρ = 1 in (2.4). This
is equivalent to assuming the perfect substitution between innovation and imitation for
technological progress. We thus have the following productivity growth function.
Ai,t = Ai,t−1 + λ[uσm,i,ts
1−σ
m,i,t(A¯t−1 − At−1) + γuφn,i,ts1−φn,i,tAt−1] (3.1)






















































The above equation shows that the ratios of unskilled to skilled employment are pro-
portional across activities.











































which is fixed for the given the distance to the technological frontier and other para-
meters. This is an extreme case after the assumption of perfect substitution between
innovation and imitation, since it emphasizes only the demand side of the labor market.
However, this simplification will help us to solve the equilibrium analytically in later
part of this chapter.
Substituting (3.11) into (3.2), we have the equilibrium wage rate of unskilled labor. By
substituting it back into (3.11), we can get the equilibrium wage rate of skilled labor.























1− φ · ϕ (3.15)
From (3.14) and (3.15), we can see that the ratio of unskilled labor and skilled labor
in imitation or innovation is a fixed proportion of wage ratio, depending on the skilled-
and unskilled-labor elasticity of productivity growth. Since σ > φ, unskilled labor is
used more intensively in imitation than in innovation.
3.2 Consumption
For this section, we mainly follow the model in chapter 2, except making a further
assumption on the human capital acquired through education. We assume that it is also
affected by the size of educated population (s) besides the distance to the frontier (a),
given limited educational resource. Thus, we denote the human capital an individual
acquires in education as H(a, s) ≥ 1.
We maintain the assumption that ∂H(a)
∂a
> 0, and ∂
2H(a)
∂a2
< 0. Besides, educated pop-
ulation has a non-monotonic effect on the educational output. When the country is at
a primary stage of development, larger size of educated population will benefit the in-
dividual students through scale effects. However, such effect has diminishing returns,
and as the educated population grows beyond the capacity of educational resource, it
might have negative effect on individual human capital acquisition as a result of “over-
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crowding effect”. Thus, ∂
2H(a,s)
∂s2
< 0, with the sign of ∂H(a,s)
∂s
ambiguous. Finally, the
interaction of the two factors a and s has a positive effect on human capital.
According to the above assumptions on human capital acquisition, we assume
H(a, s) = aι − βs2 + es+ νas+ c (3.16)
where c is a constant, and ι, β, e and ν are positive such that
∂H(a, s)
∂a
= ιaι−1 + νs > 0
∂2H(a, s)
∂a2
= ι(ι− 1)aι−2 < 0
∂H(a, s)
∂s
= −2βs+ e+ νa
∂2H(a, s)
∂s2
= −2β < 0
3.3 Equilibrium
From (3.12) we can see that the equilibrium wage rate of unskilled labor is constant over
time for given a. Substituting (3.11), (3.14) and (3.15) into the equal income equation
(2.20), we have the following equilibrium wage rate of unskilled labor.
w∗u =
(1− θ)f
(1− τ){ρ(1 + g¯)[H(a, s)ϕ− L(a)]− 1} (3.17)
Equate (3.12) with (3.17), we can get
H(a∗, s∗) =
(1− θ)f + (1− a∗)(1− τ)λδσ ( σ
1−σ
)σ−1





Given the functional form of H(a, s), the equilibrium population of skilled workers s




(e+ νa)2 − 4β(∆− aι − c)
2β
(3.19)
We take only the positive square root, since we assume that the country has incentives to
promote education, and the low level of equilibrium skilled worker population is tran-
sitory, hence the longrun equilibrium is at a higher level of skilled worker population.
We also assume that the parameters are such that there exists a solution for s∗.
Substituting (3.14) and (3.15) into (2.9) and (2.10) respectively, and substituting S and




1− φ = u[1 + L(a)] (3.20)
sm + sn = sH(a, s) (3.21)
Substituting (3.21) into (3.20), we have
sm =
(1− σ)(1− φ)
ϕ(σ − φ) [1 + L(a)]u−
φ(1− σ)
σ − φ sH(a, s) (3.22)
um =
σ(1− φ)
σ − φ [1 + L(a)]u−
ϕφσ
σ − φsH(a, s) (3.23)
sn =
σ(1− φ)
σ − φ sH(a)−
(1− σ)(1− φ)
ϕ(σ − φ) [1 + L(a)]u (3.24)
where s follows equation (3.19).
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3.4 Economic Growth and Income Inequality






















where sm follows equation (3.22).




 −∆√e2 − 4β(∆− aι − c) + e+
√















are all positive, since
∆ = H(a∗, s∗) > 0.




















The implication is as follows. From ∂H(a,s)
∂s
= −2βs + e + νa, we can see e as an




larger positive interval of ∂H(a,s)
∂s
for various s values. Since low e, a, and ν feature the
education and growth of countries far from the technological frontier, i.e. low-income
economies, the inequalities (3.27-3.29) imply that the growth effects of increase in ed-
ucation subsidy and reduction of income tax are stronger for countries farther from the
technological frontier. And such policies benefit only countries far away from the tech-
nological frontier, and they may have drawback effect on growth for countries close to
the technological frontier. This is consistent with the heterogeneous effect of education
discussed in Krueger and Lindahl (2001).
As for income inequality, from equation (3.11), we can see that the wage ratio is in-
creasing in a without bound. This implies that the income inequality increases as the
country gets closer to the technological frontier. Since this result is drawn merely from
the production part of the model, we can see it as a result of skill-biased technologi-
cal change in which demand for skilled labor increases and demand for unskilled labor
decreases as the country moves toward the technological frontier and introduces more
advanced technology. This helps to understand the increasing income inequality in the
course of economic development. In the next chapter, we will further discuss these
growth effects by comparing them with the result in the general model.
23
Chapter 4
Comparative Static Analysis of the General Model
We can solve the equilibrium for the general model through simulation of equation
(2.24) and (2.25). The baseline parameter values are ρ = 0.9, σ = 0.4, φ = 0.3, g¯ =
0.03, λ = 0.1, θ = 0.5, f = 0.06, α = 0.4, r = 1 and a = 0.5. And we get the base-
line equilibrium supply of skilled labor s = 0.25739221, growth rate g = 0.0546953,
and wage ratio ws
wu
= 10.08955 2. By changing one of these parameters, and keeping
other parameters in the baseline model fixed, we can do the following comparative static
analysis.
4.1 Distance to the Technological Frontier
4.1.1 Distance to the Technological Frontier and Growth
The relation of distance to the technological frontier and growth can be seen from figure
2. The effect of distance to the frontier on growth is not monotonic. The low-income
and middle-income economies (those with a below 0.52) belong to a “convergence
1See figure 1.
2These values are for the purpose of illustration.
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club”, since the growth rate falls dramatically as a increases. However, higher-income
economies show weak divergence.
When a country is far from the technological frontier, it has a “backward advantage”
in growth, since it can benefit more from having more to imitate. When the country
gets closer to the technological frontier, the “backward advantage” from imitation will
diminish, but the frontier economy still remains technological advantage in innovation,
thus it is hard for other countries to catch up. This result is consistent with the recent
literature and empirical evidence of “convergence club”.
Since the above result is derived from growth effect of a only, while in reality a is also
related with other parameters like ρ. In the following section, we will take into account
the co-movement of ρ and a, and find the convergence of growth in all countries.
4.1.2 Distance to the Technological Frontier and Income Inequality
In this chapter, we continue to use wage ratio as the measure of income inequality. In-
teresting result can be achieved if we compare the wage ratio in the general model with
the simplified model in the previous chapters. With perfect substitution between inno-
vation and imitation, we can get the relation of wage ratio and distance to the frontier
merely from production, i. e. the demand for labor. From equation (3.11), we can see
that wage ratio ϕ is increasing in a without bound. The more a country is close to the
technological frontier, the more individual income inequality.
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However, things become different if labor supply is also taken into account as in the
general model. The effect of distance to the frontier to wage ratio is not monotonic, as
indicated by figure 3. As a country gets closer to the technological frontier, the demand
for skilled labor will increase, as a result of more innovation at higher technological
levels. Such demand effect will cause an increase in wage ratio. In the meanwhile,
the increase in wage ratio will trigger a higher supply of skilled labor, since education
becomes more beneficial. This will further result in a decrease in wage ratio, which
is the supply effect. For countries with low level of a, i.e. being farther away from
the technological frontier, the demand effect dominates, thus the closer a country is
to the technological frontier, the greater income inequality. However, for high level
of a, the supply effect dominates, the income inequality will fall as the country gets
closer to the technological frontier. Therefore, we have an inverted-U shape of the
relation between income inequality and distance to the technological frontier. Since
distance to the technological frontier can be regarded as an inverse measure of economic
development, this relation verifies Kuznets’ inverted-U pattern inequality.
4.2 Substitutability between Imitation and Innovation
In the general model, we have a productivity growth function in which ρ is a measure
for the substitutability between imitation and innovation.
Since imitation is easier to be carried out, higher ρ implies it is easier to use imita-
tion to substitute for innovation for technological progress. This could happen mainly
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in countries close to the technological frontier, because imitation is more technology-
intensive and productivity-enhancing at a higher productivity level. In this sense, the
substitutability (ρ) is positively related with the country’s proximity to the technological
frontier (a).
From figure 4 and 5, we can see that with all other parameters fixed, the growth rate is
decreasing in ρ, while the wage ratio is increasing in ρ. As the substitutability increases,
there will be more unskilled labor substituting for skilled labor. As a result, skilled
labor become more scarce, and get higher paid, and the income inequality will increase
(see table 2). Since skilled labor is more efficient in productivity improvement, such a
change will retard economic growth.
Now consider the positive correlation between ρ and a. If such a correlation is strong,
we can use figure 4 and 5 to depict the growth and inequality for various distances
to the frontier. When the country is far from the technological frontier and has a low
substitutability between imitation and innovation, it has a relatively higher growth rate
than those countries close to the frontier. This helps to explain the convergence in
economic growth for countries at all distances to the frontier. Similarly, income in-
equality becomes worse as a country gets closer to the technological frontier and has
a higher substitutability between imitation and innovation. However, if such a correla-
tion is week, it is hard for the high-income countries to catch up with the technological
frontier, following figure 2.
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4.3 Education subsidy and Education cost
The effect of education subsidy (θ) on growth and income distribution can be clearly
seen in figure 6 and 7. The subsidy for education cost is positively related to economic
growth, and negatively related to income inequality.
The education subsidy could increase the lifelong income of skilled labor by reducing
the education cost, therefore, the higher subsidy, the more incentive for individuals to
seek for education. Under our assumption of σ > φ, skilled labor is more efficient
in technological progress, especially in innovation. Thus, the encouraging effect of
subsidy on skilled labor supply could enhance economic growth.
The other effect of education subsidy is to reduce income inequality. This results from
the increased supply of skilled labor3. Since the subsidy has no direct impact on labor
demand, with more subsidy and thus more supply of skilled labor, the wage of skilled
labor is lower, and it helps to reduce the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor.
By analogue to the above analysis, the effect of change in education cost (f ) is opposite
to the change in education subsidy (see figure 8 and 9). The level of education cost re-
flects how complicated (or advanced) the educational system is. As education becomes
more advance and expensive, fewer people will invest in education. Therefore, higher
education cost results in lower economic growth and increased income inequality, if
other factors are fixed. It is beneficial to economic growth and income distribution to




The income tax rate is negatively related with growth rate and positively related with
wage ratio (see figure 10 and 11). In the equal income equation (2.20), the L.H.S.
is the present value of the lifelong income difference between skilled and unskilled
worker, which can be seen as the reward for education, while the R.H.S. is the cost
for education. When a higher tax rate is imposed, the expected reward for education
is lower, and this will discourage the supply of skilled labor. The supply of skilled
labor in both innovation and in imitation decreased (see table 4), while the supply of
unskilled labor changes in the opposite direction. Since skilled labor is more effective in
technological progress, the increase in unskilled labor can not compensate the decrease
in skilled labor for technological progress. As a result, less technological progress is
achieved and the growth of productivity declines. Besides, lower supply of skilled labor
and higher supply of unskilled labor increase the wage rate of skilled labor and decrease
that of unskilled labor, thus the wage gap between is greater as tax rate increases.
4.5 Monopoly
α can be viewed as an inverse measure for monopoly power, since it is negatively related
with the price in the monopolistic competitive intermediate sector.
The relation between growth rate and monopoly power is an inverted-U pattern as in
figure 12. Lower monopoly power implies lower price and more market demand, and
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higher monopoly power implies higher price and less market demand. Since the profit
of the monopolist is determined by both price and demand as in (2.3), only when both
of them take moderate values can the monopolist earn a high profit. And since in our
model, the intermediate sector is monopolistic competitive and performs R&D activities
including imitation and innovation, the profit of intermediate firm is closely related
with the productivity growth. The higher the profit, the more incentive for productivity
improvement. Therefore, productivity growth rate is related with α in an inverted-U
shape.
From figure 13, we can see that for most degree of monopoly4, its effect on income
distribution is very weak, except that for highly monopolistic economies, reduction in
monopoly power can slightly reduce the income inequality, and for highly competitive
countries, it will dramatically increase the income inequality. This is because that the
extreme competitiveness discourages the productivity improvement by the intermediate
sector. From table 6, we can see that the demand of skilled labor decreases as the
market becomes more and more competitive, and this will result in decline in wage
rate of skilled labor and the subsequent supply of skilled labor. When the economy is
highly competitive, the supply effect dominates, therefore leads to increased wage ratio
of skilled labor and unskilled labor.
4approximately from 0.1 to 0.6 in a unit interval (0,1)
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4.6 Skilled-Labor and Unskilled-Labor Elasticities of Productivity Growth
σ and φ are the unskilled-labor elasticity of productivity growth in imitation and inno-
vation respectively (see equation (2.4)). As in figure 14-17 and table 7-8, growth rate
increases in both σ and φ, and wage ratio decreases in both σ and φ.
From equation (2.4), the increase in σ (resp. φ) means unskilled labor is relatively more
efficient in imitation (resp. innovation). Since unskilled labor takes a much larger pro-
portion than skilled labor, this will increase the total productivity Ai,t and thus enhance
economic growth. With more efficient unskilled labor, the demand for skilled labor,
thus the wage of skilled labor will fall. Therefore, there will be a higher growth rate and
lower income inequality for greater σ and φ.
4.7 The Growth Rate of the Technological Frontier and Interest Rate
We have defined g¯ as the growth rate of the technological frontier. From figure 18 and
19, we find that the growth rate of a country is positively related with g¯, and income
inequality is negatively related with g¯.
The first result is straight forward. For given distance to the technological frontier, the
growth rate of a country is proportional to that of the frontier.
The channel of these effects can be found in the consumption part. In equation (2.20),
the R.H.S. is the cost for education, and L.H.S. is the benefit from education, i.e. the
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lifetime difference of wage income between skilled worker and unskilled worker. As
g¯ increases, the L.H.S., i.e. the benefit from education increases, thus the supply of
skilled labor will increase under such a shock. With more supply of skilled labor, the
wage of skilled labor will fall and the wage of unskilled labor will increase5, until the
benefit of education equals its cost. Therefore, income inequality decreases at g¯.
Interest rate (r) also enters the model in equation (2.20) , but it affect labor supply and
growth in the opposite direction as g¯. By analogue to the above analysis, interest rate
is negatively related with growth rate, and positively related with wage ratio (see figure
20 and 21).
4.8 Efficiency of Overall Technological Improvement
From the equation of growth rate (2.6), the increase in efficiency of overall technologi-
cal improvement (λ) is growth enhancing 6. The reason is trivial.
The increase in the efficiency of overall technological improvement (λ) will encour-
age the activities of both innovation and imitation, and increase the demand of both
skilled labor and unskilled labor, therefore, its effect on income inequality is weak for
more most λ values. Since innovation is more efficient than imitation, and skilled la-
bor is used more intensive in innovation, the increase in overall efficiency will increase




reducing effect of λ.
4.9 Relative Efficiency of Innovation
As illustrated by figure 24, the relative efficiency of innovation is positively related with
economic growth. The increase in the relative efficiency of innovation (γ) will motive
more demand for the both skilled and unskilled labor in innovation, thus result in a flow
of both types of labor from imitation to innovation (see table 12). And since innovation
is more growth enhancing than imitation, such a flow of labor will help the economy to
growth faster.
From figure 25, we can see the negative relation between the relative efficiency of in-
novation (γ) and wage ratio. As the efficiency of innovation increases, intermediate
sector will tend to hire more skilled labor, since skilled labor has a higher elasticity of
productivity growth in innovation than in imitation. As a result, the inflow of skilled
labor to innovation exceeds the outflow of skilled labor from imitation, and the demand
for skilled labor will increase.
From equation (2.12) and (2.13), we see that wages of skilled labor and unskilled labor
are both positively related with the relative efficiency of innovation (γ). Thus, the L.H.S.
of equation (2.20), i.e. the benefit from education increases in γ, and there will be more
total supply of skilled labor for greater γ. However, since the increase in the demand of
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skilled labor is the inflow of sn net of the outflow of sm7, which are both a proportion of
the total skilled labor, thus the supply of skilled labor increases faster than the demand
for it. Therefore, the wage ratio of skilled labor and unskilled labor will fall at an





In this thesis, we endogenize the human capital accumulation, i.e. the supply of skilled
labor, in the quality-improving growth model. This general equilibrium model is versa-
tile in examining the various factors influencing economic growth and income distribu-
tion.
The trend of income distribution in the course of a country’s economic growth has
attracted much attention from economists. In this thesis we show that inequality of
income distribution has an inverted-U relation with the economic development, by using
the wage ratio of skilled and unskilled labor as a measure of income inequality and the
distance to the technological frontier as an inverse measure of economic development.
Therefore, we verify Kuznets’ inverted-U hypothesis of growth and inequality in the
general equilibrium growth model with quality-improving innovations.
The economic growth exhibits convergence, under the condition that the positive cor-
relation of the proximity to the technological frontier and the substitutability between
innovation and imitation is strong. If this correlation is weak, it might be difficult for
high-income countries to catch up with the technological frontier.
Since the equilibrium of labor market is determined by both production and consump-
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tion decisions, the government can influence the equilibrium supply of skilled and un-
skilled labor through education subsidies and income taxes. We find that a higher edu-
cation subsidy and a lower income tax are growth enhancing, and help to reduce income
inequality. Furthermore, we find that if there is perfect substitution between imitation
and innovation, an increase in education subsidy or a reduction of income tax are growth
enhancing for only countries far from the technological frontier. This is consistent with
the heterogeneous effect of education discussed in Krueger and Lindahl (2001).
The product market competition also affects growth and income inequality. We find
that a medium level of monopoly power helps to maintain high growth and low income
inequality. Besides, it also helps economic growth and inequality reduction to increase
the elasticities of unskilled labor in both innovation and imitation, the overall efficiency
of technological improvement, and the relative efficiency of innovation, or to decrease
interest rate.
In short, income inequality has an inverted-U shape relation with economic develop-
ment. Economic growth can exhibit convergence under certain conditions. Medium
levels of monopoly power in product market help to maintain high growth and low
income inequality. To promote economic growth and control income inequality, gov-
ernments, especially those of poor countries, should increase subsidies to education
and reduce income taxes. Besides, it always helps inequality reduction and economic
growth to improve the efficiency of both unskilled workers and skilled workers, which
requires better education or training for workers.
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This thesis is open for further discussion. For example, labor can be further classified
into low-skilled, medium-skilled and high-skilled labor. The low-skilled labor requires
no training or schooling, and is only used in production, while the other two types of
labor are acquired through training or schooling, and involve R&D activities. Besides,
we can assume heterogeneity in individual talent level, which might follow certain dis-
tribution (for example, uniform distribution). As a result, individuals at different talent
levels achieve different educational benefits, and only those above a certain equilibrium
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ψ(σ − φ) [1 + L(a)]u
Since the policy variables θ and ρ only appear in s and H(a, s) as in equations (3.18)




































= s · (I) (5.5)






(e+ νa)2 − 4β(∆− aι − c) +
e+ νa+
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Substituting (3.11) into (I), we can get (I) > 0. It is obvious to see − f
ρ(1+g¯)ψ
< 0. To



















































































































































































































































































































Figure 25: γ and ws/wu
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Table 1: Comparative Statics of a
a ws/wu g s sm sn u um un ws wu
0.3 6.858218 0.130433 0.3043491 0.30421028 0.00013886 0.69565086 1.390893573 0.000408144 0.003761258 0.000548431
0.4 8.323334 0.0792145 0.2663409 0.26100331 0.00533756 0.73365913 1.448278401 0.019039852 0.003310601 0.000397749
0.5 10.08955 0.0546953 0.2573922 0.15494801 0.10244417 0.74260782 1.042237425 0.442978218 0.002664119 0.000264047
0.6 8.89419 0.057030 0.339925 0.011534 0.32839104 0.66007496 0.068390364 1.251759563 0.001104963 0.000124234
0.7 7.091719 0.0615849 0.3968085 0.00021303 0.39659546 0.6031915 0.001007181 1.205375826 0.000281068 0.0000396332
where ρ = 0.9, σ = 0.4, φ = 0.3, N = 1, g¯ = 0.03, λ = 0.1, θ = 0.5, f = 0.006, τ = 0.2, α = 0.4, r = 0.1, γ = 1.1.
Table 2: Comparative Statics of ρ
ρ ws/wu g s sm sn u um un ws wu
0.1 2.103952 55.984958 0.6410367 0.27929033 0.36174638 0.3589633 0.39174222 0.3261844 2.828578249 1.344412229
0.3 2.764019 0.3934378 0.5765465 0.2491141 0.32743235 0.42345355 0.459037422 0.3878697 0.01847457 0.006683952
0.5 4.584494 0.1363175 0.4503045 0.19663862 0.2536659 0.54969548 0.600992431 0.498398526 0.006498973 0.001417599
0.7 7.188831 0.0792624 0.3407233 0.15704911 0.18367423 0.65927665 0.752666322 0.565886986 0.003785734 0.000526613
0.9 10.08955 0.0546953 0.2573922 0.15494801 0.10244417 0.74260782 1.042237425 0.442978218 0.002664119 0.000264047
where a = 0.5, σ = 0.4, φ = 0.3, N = 1, g¯ = 0.03, λ = 0.1, θ = 0.5, f = 0.006, τ = 0.2, α = 0.4, r = 0.1, γ = 1.1.52
Table 3: Comparative Statics of θ
θ ws/wu g s sm sn u um un ws wu
0.1 31.31573 0.0312258 0.0932792 0.07531252 0.01796664 0.90672084 1.572310911 0.241130762 0.003092407 0.0000987493
0.3 18.47877 0.0413212 0.1526767 0.11035439 0.0423224 0.84732326 1.359475761 0.33517075 0.0029233373 0.0001581998
0.5 10.08955 0.0546953 0.2573922 0.15494801 0.10244417 0.74260782 1.042237425 0.442978218 0.002664119 0.000264047
0.7 5.248424 0.0682994 0.4149569 0.18942756 0.22552938 0.58504306 0.662797379 0.507288742 0.0022911987 0.0004365499
0.9 2.793214 0.0761308 0.5862352 0.18908664 0.39714853 0.41376483 0.35210636 0.475423291 0.001861274 0.000666355
where a = 0.5, ρ = 0.9, σ = 0.4, φ = 0.3, N = 1, g¯ = 0.03, λ = 0.1, f = 0.006, τ = 0.2, α = 0.4, r = 0.1, γ = 1.1.
Table 4: Comparative Statics of τ
τ ws/wu g s sm sn u um un ws wu
0.1 8.434741 0.0587013 0.2965094 0.16687625 0.12963311 0.70349064 0.938371988 0.468609291 0.002571483 0.000304868
0.2 10.08955 0.0546953 0.2573922 0.15494801 0.10244417 0.74260782 1.042237425 0.442978218 0.002664119 0.000264047
0.3 12.62538 0.0496295 0.2136199 0.13868374 0.07493618 0.78638008 1.16728976 0.405470402 0.002769527 0.000219362
0.4 16.79248 0.0433469 0.1664395 0.11737574 0.04906377 0.83356049 1.314019939 0.353101045 0.0028875 0.000171952
where a = 0.5, ρ = 0.9, σ = 0.4, φ = 0.3, N = 1, g¯ = 0.03, λ = 0.1, θ = 0.5, f = 0.006, α = 0.4, r = 0.1, γ = 1.1.
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Table 5: Comparative Statics of f
f ws/wu g s sm sn u um un ws wu
0.001 2.659086 0.0764262 0.5992083 0.18751824 0.41169006 0.4007917 0.332418047 0.469165349 0.001826478 0.000686882
0.003 4.459033 0.0709867 0.4589956 0.19296082 0.26603479 0.54100439 0.573612487 0.508396296 0.002184709 0.000489951
0.005 7.703442 0.06068 0.3176249 0.17235176 0.14527314 0.68237511 0.885134535 0.479615677 0.002521729 0.000327351
0.007 13.09556 0.0488089 0.2070424 0.13595747 0.07108489 0.79295764 1.186959603 0.398955681 0.002785632 0.000212716
0.009 21.24188 0.0384681 0.1343837 0.10041315 0.03397058 0.86561627 1.421975877 0.309256661 0.002972451 0.000139934
where a = 0.5, ρ = 0.9, σ = 0.4, φ = 0.3, N = 1, g¯ = 0.03, λ = 0.1, θ = 0.5, τ = 0.2, α = 0.4, r = 0.1, γ = 1.1.
Table 6: Comparative Statics of α
α ws/wu g s sm sn u um un ws wu
0.1 18.13543 0.0417142 0.1552954 0.11171999 0.04357545 0.84470456 1.350726544 0.338682577 0.002102993 0.00011596
0.3 10.08955 0.0546953 0.2573922 0.15494801 0.10244417 0.74260782 1.042237425 0.442978218 0.002664119 0.000264047
0.5 13.71868 0.0477706 0.1989072 0.13247908 0.06642814 0.80109277 1.211625583 0.390559965 0.002343584 0.000170832
0.7 34.57365 0.0295573 0.0848375 0.06963996 0.01519756 0.91516248 1.60513852 0.22518644 0.001657308 0.0000479
0.9 463.451 0.006413 0.0064791 0.00634515 0.00013391 0.99352094 1.96044373 0.026598145 0.000651891 .14066e− 510−5
where a = 0.5, ρ = 0.9, σ = 0.4, φ = 0.3, N = 1, g¯ = 0.03, λ = 0.1, θ = 0.5, τ = 0.2, f = 0.006, r = 0.1, γ = 1.1.54
Table 7: Comparative Statics of σ
σ ws/wu g s sm sn u um un ws wu
0.4 10.08955 0.0546953 0.2573922 0.15494801 0.10244417 0.74260782 1.042237425 0.442978218 0.002664119 0.000264047
0.5 8.122023 0.0586352 0.2121091 0.18044175 3.17E-02 0.78789092 1.465552115 0.110229735 0.00252525 0.000310914
0.6 6.530912 0.0674178 0.1744773 0.16616015 8.32E-03 0.8255227 1.627765999 0.023279399 0.002245434 0.000343816
0.7 5.361013 0.0810147 0.1392307 0.13726207 0.00196864 0.86076929 1.717015497 0.004523093 0.001885352 0.000351678
where a = 0.5, ρ = 0.9, φ = 0.3, N = 1, g¯ = 0.03, λ = 0.1, θ = 0.5, τ = 0.2, α = 0.4, f = 0.006, r = 0.1, γ = 1.1.
Table 8: Comparative Statics of φ
φ ws/wu g s sm sn u um un ws wu
0.1 10.71807 0.050687 0.238657 0.20798959 0.03066739 0.76134302 1.486164363 0.03652168 0.002853585 0.000266241
0.15 10.68261 0.050844 0.2391483 0.20449815 0.03465018 0.76085167 1.456382 0.065321333 0.002842908 0.000266125
0.2 10.59395 0.0515363 0.2431074 0.19707512 0.04603226 0.75689263 1.391869393 0.121915861 0.002821381 0.00026632
0.25 10.41697 0.0528095 0.2498486 0.18222599 0.06762264 0.75015137 1.265495073 0.234807664 0.002772748 0.000266176
where a = 0.5, ρ = 0.9, σ = 0.4, N = 1, g¯ = 0.03, λ = 0.1, θ = 0.5, τ = 0.2, α = 0.3, f = 0.006, r = 0.1, γ = 1.1.
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Table 9: Comparative Statics of g¯
g¯ ws/wu g s sm sn u um un ws wu
0.015 10.32994 0.0541633 0.2525195 0.15329401 0.09922549 0.74748049 1.055678256 0.439282731 0.002675735 0.000259027
0.025 10.16836 0.0545196 0.2557751 0.15440332 0.10137174 0.74422495 1.046685329 0.441764564 0.002667972 0.00026238
0.035 10.01203 0.0548694 0.2590022 0.15548614 0.10351602 0.74099784 1.037821729 0.444173959 0.002660286 0.000265709
0.045 9.860743 0.0552128 0.2622005 0.15654293 0.1056576 0.73779947 1.029086448 0.446512485 0.002652677 0.000269014
where a = 0.5, ρ = 0.9, σ = 0.4, φ = 0.3, N = 1, λ = 0.1, θ = 0.5, τ = 0.2, α = 0.4, f = 0.006, r = 0.1, γ = 1.1.
Table 10: Comparative Statics of r
r ws/wu g s sm sn u um un ws wu
0.01 8.669345 0.0580947 0.2902905 0.16513702 0.12515343 0.70970954 0.954419835 0.464999251 0.002586157 0.000298311
0.02 8.819507 0.0577134 0.2864387 0.16403048 0.12240823 0.71356129 0.96444532 0.462677263 0.002595253 0.000294263
0.03 8.971555 0.0573328 0.2826366 0.16291604 0.11972059 0.71736337 0.974406808 0.46031994 0.002604238 0.000290277
0.04 9.125499 0.0569529 0.278884 0.16179437 0.11708963 0.721116 0.984302902 0.457929104 0.002613113 0.000286353
where a = 0.5, ρ = 0.9, σ = 0.4, φ = 0.3, N = 1, g¯ = 0.03, λ = 0.1, γ = 1.1, θ = 0.5, τ = 0.2, α = 0.3, f = 0.006.
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Table 11: Comparative Statics of λ
λ ws/wu g s sm sn u um un ws wu
0.1 10.08955 0.0546953 0.2573922 0.15494801 0.10244417 0.74260782 1.042237425 0.442978218 0.002664119 0.000264047
0.5 2.793214 0.3806539 0.5862352 0.18908664 0.39714853 0.41376483 0.35210636 0.475423291 0.009306368 0.003331777
1.0 2.41457 0.7686582 0.624186 0.18387702 0.44030897 0.37581401 0.295989322 0.455638703 0.017582605 0.007281878
1.5 2.303205 1.1552132 0.636166 0.18183745 0.45432854 0.36383401 0.279205905 0.448462115 0.025873842 0.011233844
where a = 0.5, ρ = 0.9, σ = 0.4, φ = 0.3, N = 1, g¯ = 0.03, θ = 0.5, τ = 0.2, α = 0.4, f = 0.006, r = 0.1, γ = 1.1.
Table 12: Comparative Statics of γ
γ ws/wu g s sm sn u um un ws wu
1 10.54098 0.0507506 0.2343749 0.18824436 0.04613052 0.76562512 1.322852792 0.208397442 0.00278441 0.000264151
1.1 10.08955 0.0546953 0.2573922 0.15494801 0.10244417 0.74260782 1.042237425 0.442978218 0.002664119 0.000264047
1.2 9.377288 0.0611036 0.291965 0.10870754 0.18325749 0.70803498 0.679587896 0.736482056 0.002430485 0.000259189
1.3 8.51812 0.0693039 0.3306395 0.06492741 0.2657121 0.66936049 0.368706316 0.97001467 0.002103085 0.000246895
where a = 0.5, ρ = 0.9, σ = 0.4, φ = 0.3, N = 1, g¯ = 0.03, λ = 0.1, θ = 0.5, τ = 0.2, α = 0.3, f = 0.006, r = 0.1.
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